Last week the governor of the Afghan central bank adjusted World Bank estimates for his country's economic growth in 2008. What was the verdict? A 50 percent decrease in gross domestic product (GDP). Among the reasons cited for the change were a harsh winter, drought, rising food prices and a significant decrease in foreign investment. The latter, he noted, is driven by the increased activity of the Taliban insurgency, corruption and poor infrastructure. One aspect of the economy he did not directly refer to is the opium trade. Why not? Coincidentally, that sector is doing just fine.
At a time when foreign policy and military debates are shifting toward Afghanistan and how to secure its stability and development in the context of US national security interests, it is only fair to put counter-narcotic strategy on the hot seat. Specifically, what can we do to improve it? To answer this, we must first recognize two caveats. First, counter-narcotic strategy is a long-term affair requiring a balance between aggressive measures, e.g. eradication, and softer approaches, e.g. poverty reduction. This means that the slashing of poppy fields must be complemented by the creation of alternative sources of income and regional interdiction of drug shipments. Second, the policy is only as reliable as the government institutions it empowers. For instance, legal prosecution of narcotic traffickers is wholly dependent on competent judicial systems including incorruptible police, lawyers, and judges. With these assumptions in mind, let's look at two inhibitors of successful counter-narcotic strategy—corruption and regional cooperation.
The head of the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in Afghanistan last month spoke of criminal networks that maneuver for the release of drug trafficking suspects from pre-trial detention with a single cell phone call. With a process that painless, it is not difficult to assume that these are the same networks with political connections up to the highest level of government in Kabul. According to the State Department's former coordinator for counter-narcotic strategy in Afghanistan, President Hamid Karzai instructed the attorney general to refrain from prosecuting senior government officials accused of corruption, and in some cases collusion in the drug trade, "for political reasons."
A strategy to target these drug trade actors at the top of the food chain, senior government officials and agents of the trafficking network, should be actively pursued. This plan should involve restricting access to financial resources by freezing bank assets, limiting movement by placing restrictions on travel, and the immediate removal of provincial-level law enforcement administrators compromised by corruption. Collaboration on complementary counter-narcotic strategies with other countries in the region is another factor to consider.
Recent developments give hope to the prospect of cooperation in combating the flow of narcotics across Asia and the Middle East. Coalition warships in the Arabian Gulf, consisting of the US and British navies, seized over 30 tons of narcotics in the past few months according to a recent US Navy statement. In the United Arab Emirates this week, police seized nearly US$11 million worth of heroin and arrested 19 Afghan suspects in connection with the seizure. Even the military dictatorship regime in Burma got into the act, claiming the arrest of over 300 traffickers and multiple opium seizures during the month of July.
European nations with diplomatic contact in Tehran, some whose troops in NATO are fighting the very same Taliban financed in part by the drug trade, would do well to openly raise their concerns over regional narcotic trafficking with the Iranians. Another immediate neighbor, Pakistan, also needs to take ownership of its complicity in the regional drug trade. As a Brookings Institution senior expert on the Middle East and South Asia recently noted, "If 90 percent of the world's heroin is grown in Afghanistan, almost all of it is shipped through the Port of Karachi."
US pressure on Pakistan to chase drug trafficking within its borders and on its shores is imperative. The billions of dollars being wired through the US Defense Department to the government in Islamabad for anti-terrorist assistance can be leveraged for greater cooperation on this front. The Taliban and affiliated insurgents, who roam freely in the tribal border areas in western Pakistan, directly profit from the opium trade. These groups may be able to eventually recover from the financial repercussions of a disrupted drug trade, but it would nonetheless knock them off balance and debilitate their ability to readily procure the resources necessary to inflict the kind of damage witnessed in last month's Indian Embassy bombing in Kabul or the recent bridge bombing in Peshawar. Indeed, Pakistan must remain an ally and conducive to US interests in the region. However, a little tough love diplomacy with Islamabad in the context of counter-narcotic strategy is warranted under the circumstances. Rooting out internal corruption in Afghanistan and leveraging regional support are not a comprehensive counter-narcotic policy. Increased focus on these two areas, however, could stimulate foreign investment for the Afghans and weaken an enemy in the region.